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ABSTRACT: This chapter introduces the ‘Accountability Principle’ and its role in data 
protection (DP) governance. We focus on what accountability means in the context of 
cybersecurity management in smart homes, considering the EU General Data Protection 
Law (GDPR) requirements to secure personal data. This discussion sits against the 
backdrop of two key new developments in data protection law. Firstly, the law is moving 
into the home, due to narrowing of the so called ‘household exemption’. Concurrently, 
household occupants may now have legal responsibilities to comply with the GDPR, as 
they find themselves jointly responsible for compliance, as they are possibly held to 
determine the means and purposes of data collection with IoT device vendors. As a 
complex socio-technical space, we consider the interactions between accountability 
requirements and the competencies of this new class of ‘domestic data controllers’ (DDC).  
Specifically, we consider the value and limitations of edge-based security analytics to 
manage smart home cybersecurity risks, reviewing a range of prototypes and studies of 
their use. We also reflect on interpersonal power dynamics in the domestic setting e.g. 
device control; existing social practices around privacy and security management in smart 
homes; and usability issues that may hamper DDCs ability to rely on such solutions. We 
conclude by reflecting on 1) the need for collective security management in homes and 2) 
the increasingly complex divisions of responsibility in smart homes between device users, 
account holders, IoT device/software/firmware vendors, and third parties. 
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2.1 Introduction 
Consider the following scenarios. A teenage son wants to lodge a right to be forgotten request 
with his father for compromising smart camera footage at their family home?4 Or a 
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student vacating her flat submits a data portability request to her flatmate to obtain the 
heating schedule built up in their learning thermostat?5 A grandparent living with their 
adult children is concerned about them monitoring his diet and submits a subject access 
request to their daughter to see what the smart fridge knows? These situations may seem 
far-fetched, but this paper unpacks how data protection obligations between household 
members are increasingly being recalibrated, making these scenarios more likely in the 
future. This is because the law is moving into the home, due to narrowing of the so 
called ‘household exemption’. Concurrently, household occupants may now have legal 
responsibilities to comply with the GDPR, as they find themselves jointly responsible 
for compliance, as they are possibly held determine the means and purposes of data 
collection with IoT device vendors. 
To focus our discussion, in this chapter, we examine one set of near-future data 
protection problems: what the EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) 
obligations around the accountability principle will require in smart homes for cybersecurity. 
This involves unpacking what cybersecurity duties household occupants may have and 
how they should manage these. 
This chapter is composed of 3 primary sections.  
We will begin in the introduction by setting some brief context particularly around 
the high-level message which is: accountability is an important element of the GDPR 
but changes in data protection law practice mean individuals operating IoT devices in 
smart homes may need to find ways of providing demonstrations of accountability to 
data subjects i.e. their family and friends. To unpack this, we focus on demonstrations 
in relation to personal data information security requirements in the GPDR.  
In Section 2.2 we provide an overview of what the accountability principle is and 
what it might require to be realised in practice. To do this, we firstly consider how it has 
emerged historically as a governance tool, before turning to how it is framed in Article 
5(2) of the EU General Data Protection Regulation. We reflect on the obligations it 
creates for data controllers and what they need to do in order to satisfy the principle. In 
this section we will focus on 3 elements. Firstly, we situate accountability in the context 
of the GDPR more widely, considering it in conjunction with Article 24 GDPR (which 
unpacks the wider responsibilities of data controllers). We consider the implications of 
a broad reading of accountability, particularly in relation to compliance strategies for the 
GDPR and difficulties of prioritising different elements of the legislation. We offer a 
set of requirements to support this. Secondly, we unpack who accountability is owed to 
and why this is important, considering accountability requirements that domestic data 
controllers need to attend to (this theme is explored in more depth in Section 2.4). 
Thirdly, we reflect on what form a ‘demonstration of accountability’ might take (e.g. 
record keeping, privacy impact assessment, privacy by design etc.). Again, this is to raise 
opportunities controllers have and to explore what some of these might look like. We 
conclude this section by reflecting on the role of technical measures in demonstrating 
accountability for compliance with GDPR security requirements in Article 32 and 
Article 5(1)(f).  
We then turn in Section 2.3 to unpacking why we argue domestic data controllers 
exist as a class of controllers, and how we have reached this position legally. In this 
regard we reflect on the two aforementioned trends occurring in data protection law 
around the narrowing of the household exemption and joint controllership broadening. 
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We will document what each concept means in data protection law in the light of recent 
case law which underpins these shifts. We will raise some of the implications here, 
particularly stressing that it leads to DDCs having responsibilities in relation to 
demonstrations of accountability, which we pick up on in more detail in the rest of this 
section.  
In Section 2.4, we adopt a more exploratory perspective, aligning the first two parts 
to pose the question: how can domestic data controllers in smart home demonstrate 
accountability to data subjects in the home? We will focus on demonstrations in relation 
to security obligations in the GDPR. As Article 32 talks of both organisational and technical 
measures, we will use this as an opportunity to think about demonstrations under these 
2 broad headings, with particular attention to technical measures (but how they work 
within the organisation of the home). We reflect on the nature of the home as a setting 
for demonstrating accountability, consider the promise of smart home security 
technologies but also their limitations. We consider how DP law might impact the 
domestic social order, particularly with interpersonal relationships and concerns of 
control, access, permissions and power. Despite these new responsibilities, DDCs are 
likely to still be domestic users of technology who just happen to be in a position of 
authority due to hierarchies in the home or from the technology. Thus, we will conclude 
by questioning the differentiated responsibilities between vendors and DDCs 6  to 
manage accountability responsibilities. 
 
2.2 The Principle of Accountability 
In order to understand the accountability principle, we will briefly consider how it has 
emerged as a data protection tool before turning its current instantiation in Article 5(2) 
GDPR. 
2.2.1 Trajectory from the OECD 1980 to GDPR 2016. 
Despite only explicitly appearing once in the EU GDPR [1], the accountability principle 
has been key in data protection (DP) policy for decades, particularly as a means of 
enforcing fundamental principles of DP law [6]. Whilst not tightly defined in 
formulating requirements for action, its flexibility to can be a strength, particularly as it 
enables more innovative technological and organisational approaches for data 
protection compliance. 
The principle has its roots in early OECD data protection guidelines from 1980 [7]. 
These were recently updated in 2013 and simply state ‘A data controller should be 
accountable for complying with measures which give effect to the principles stated 
above”’7. The principles referred to include ‘collection limitation; data quality; purpose 
specification; use limitation; security safeguards; openness and individual participation’.8 
Apart from the last two9, these are broadly similar to the principles that existed in Article 
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6 of the former EU Data Protection Directive 1995 and Article 5(1) of the current EU 
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) 2016.  
We return to EU law below, but for now we want to briefly pick up on these final 
two OECD principles. They state accountability would also require measures that 
involve greater ‘openness about developments, practice and policies with respect to 
personal data’ and also measures to enable rights of individuals in relation to their data. 
10 This would require measures for individuals to: obtain confirmation that a controller 
has their data; to have such data communicated within a reasonable time where that can 
be for a non-excessive charge, in a reasonable manner and in an intelligible form; to 
obtain some justification is a request is rejected; and to challenge the data, including 
having it erased, rectified, completed or amended.  
The latter two principles broaden the scope of accountability, covering similar 
ground to the data subject rights around access, restriction, notification, erasure, 
portability, and objection in Articles 15-21 GDPR. Openness broadly translates to the 
transparency and information provision sections in Articles 12-14 GDPR. As we 
discuss, strict reading of Article 5(2) GDPR relates only to compliance with Article 5(1) 
hence the OECD framing is broader in content than the EU. However, as we argue 
below, Article 5(1) needs to be read in conjunction with other GDPR provisions, such 
as Article 24 on broader data controller responsibilities. This in turn makes it wider 
(arguably requiring compliance and demonstrations of this with the entire GDPR).11 
However, a key difference between the GDPR and OECD framings of accountability 
is the latter does not mandate a ‘demonstration’ of accountability, a point we return to 
below.  
A number of pre-GDPR endeavours have sought to clarify the scope of what 
accountability means. The Galway [8] and Paris [9] Projects culminating in the Madrid 
Resolution [10] are three high profile multi-stakeholder attempts12. We draw on details 
from these at different times below, where they help us to understand what a 
demonstration of accountability is (Paris and Galway Projects) or who it is owed to 
(Madrid Resolution). 
2.2.2 Article 5(2) GDPR and the obligations it creates for data controllers  
The deceptively simple Article 5(2) merely states that ‘The controller shall be 
responsible for, and be able to demonstrate compliance with, paragraph 1’. The 
principles in paragraph 1 relate to lawful processing, purpose limitation, data 
minimisation, storage limitation, accuracy, and integrity & confidentiality principles. 
Explicit inclusion of the accountability principle in the GDPR is new, where it was only 
implied in the Data Protection Directive 1995 [11]. Despite its short length, it raises a 
lot of responsibilities for controllers. Firstly, it establishes a substantive responsibility for 
controllers to comply with the series of data protection principles in Articles 5(1)(a)-(f). 
Secondly, it creates a procedural requirement for controllers to find ways to demonstrate 
their compliance with these principles [1]. The importance of accountability is thus clear 
in the sense that it severs as a meta-principle that defines how other principles should 
be observed. Despite this clarity, questions quickly begin to emerge. Is it only these 
compliance with these principles? what does a demonstration of accountability look 
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like? Is this defined in the law? Who is it owed to? Are there different requirements 
from a demonstration depending whom it is directed to? 
Furthermore, Urquhart et al. [1] argue that Article 5(2) needs to be read in light of 
wider responsibilities of data controllers detailed in Article 24 GDPR. When this is 
done, the scope of the provision is much wider, arguably requiring demonstrations of 
accountability for the entire GDPR. The text of Article 24 states: 
the nature, scope, context and purposes of processing as well as the risks of 
varying likelihood and severity for the rights and freedoms of natural persons, 
the controller shall implement appropriate technical and organisational measures to 
ensure and to be able to demonstrate that processing is performed in accordance 
with this Regulation. (Article 24(1) GDPR 2016, emphasis added).  
There are many elements to unpack in Article 24, from questions of processing to risks 
to what measures are necessary and again, what a demonstration might necessitate. 
However, given Article 24 goes far beyond just the Article 5(1) principles, it could be 
quite overwhelming for controllers to determine which elements of the GDPR should 
be prioritised (especially as there is no real hierarchy within the law of what to prioritise). 
Conscious of this, Urquhart et al. [1] attempt to break down and cluster the 
responsibilities of controllers into a series of 7 Accountability Requirements, as seen in 
Table 2.1 below (which is discussed in more detail in relation to requirement 6). From 
a procedural and substantive perspective, a data protection impact assessment (Article 
40) can be a useful tool for both surfacing processing risks whilst also providing a 
physical document that can be a demonstration. The similarities between Articles 24, 25 
(on data protection by design and default) and 32 (on managing data security) are also 
significant, where turn to technology safeguards is a key policy direction. Technologists 
are being drawn into the regulatory fray and system architecture is an acknowledged 
route to address wider responsibilities of data controllers when processing personal 
data. As this is arguably to comply with the entirety of GDPR and demonstrate how 
this is done, the scope for convergence of solutions that address Articles 24, 25 and 32 
here is sizable i.e. deploying information privacy preserving architectures by default 
could also satisfy demonstration of controller responsibilities and good security 
practices. 
2.2.3 Accountable to whom?  
The GDPR does not state who accountability is owed to or what it needs to involve, 
which the former Article 29 Working Party have argued is by design, to enable flexibility 
of application on a case by case basis [12]. This mirrors the OECD position where their 
Guidelines ‘do not prescribe to whom the controller should be accountable (the 
‘accountee’), nor what this relationship should look like’ [13]. The GDPR does not 
constrain this either. In practice it is useful to ground who should be targeted and the 
Madrid Resolution stated it should be, at least the data subject and the data protection regulator. 
However, in smart homes where DDCs may owe accountability to these parties, whilst 
themselves being users, it is less clear how this might manifest. For organisations, as we 
see below, they have tools at their disposal to demonstrate accountability. How these 
translate to the domestic, complex socio-technical context of the home, is less clear. 
This is to state the accountability requirements that domestic data controllers might 
need to attend to (picking up on this theme in more depth in Section 2.4). How might 
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they demonstrate accountability to a data subject? Much less a data protection authority? 
Who else might have a vested interest? IoT technology vendors? 
2.2.4 What form demonstrations of accountability might take? 
As noted at the beginning, accountability is a flexible notion. The fact that what a 
demonstration requires is not prescribed in law means creative approaches can emerge 
(e.g. as Urquhart et al. [1] argue, Databox can be a demonstration). Nevertheless, in 
practice we need to pin down what a demonstrable account requires to operationalise it 
to consider the range of options available to controllers [1]. Raab [6] has argued, how 
an account is framed can differ in strength from a basic level of documenting what has 
been done by a controller, to enabling questioning or subjects contesting the story, 
leading up to sanctions. after consulting guidance from the UK ICO [11], EDPS [14], 
and the pre GDPR Galway [8] and Paris [9] projects to suggest what demonstrations of 
compliance, could require, clustering guidance into technical and organizational forms. 
They are: 
 
 
As the guidance on accountability is geared towards organisations, the focus is often 
framed as developing, as the EDPS [14] puts it, a ‘culture of accountability’ and not just 
a bureaucratic ‘box ticking exercise’ [15]. In the Galway [8] and Paris [9] projects they 
unpack what a culture or demonstrable accountability might look like, ranging from 
internal governance structures for organisational compliance with DP standards, to 
enforcement bodies, training on privacy, leadership and risk analysis. 
How might this translate in a home environment where the controller is another 
household member, and data subjects are children, spouses, extended family and 
friends, trades people? We consider both in part III, with particular focus on examples 
and uses of edge computing-based security management. For now, we want to conclude 
this section by considering what the GDPR precisely states in relation to cybersecurity 
accountability obligations, to pinpoint what domestic data controllers need to 
substantively and procedurally address. 
Table 2.1 Accountability requirements in GDPR (from Urquhart et al. [1]) 
Technical measures 
Data protection by design and default; including use of anonymization, 
pseudonymization and end-to-end encryption; IT security risk management. 
Organisational measures 
Assigning DP officers (DPOs); prior consultations; certification schemes; 
DPIAs; transparent policies; documentation and record keeping on processing 
for organizations with over 250 staff; internal compliance and audits for 
effectiveness of approaches; training [1]. 
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Accountability requirement Source in GDPR 
1. Limiting initial data collection Purpose limitation Article 5(1b); data minimization Article 
5(1c); storage limitation Article 5(1e) 
2. Restrictions on international data 
transfer 
Data sent outside Europe on basis of adequacy decision 
Articles 44 and 45; binding corporate rules Article 47; 
appropriate safeguards Article 46 
3. Responding to the spectrum of 
control rights 
Right to access Article 15; to rectification Article 16; to 
object Article 21; to restrict Article 18; to portability 
Article 20; to erasure Article 17; information supply 
chain (passing down requests for rectification, erasure, 
restriction) Article 19 
4. Guaranteeing greater 
transparency rights 
Transparency of information Article 12; rights to provision 
of information Articles 13 and 14; algorithmic profiling 
Article 22; record keeping Article 30 
5. Ensuring lawfulness of processing Legality based on specific grounds (Article 5(1a) and 
Article 6, e.g. performance of contract legitimate 
interest); consent requirements Article 4 (11), Article 7, 
Article 8 and Article 9 
6. Protecting data storage and 
security 
Accuracy of data Article 5(1d); integrity and confidentiality 
Article 5(1f); breach notification to authorities Article 33 
and to data subject Article 34; security of processing 
Article 32 
7. Articulating and responding to 
processing responsibilities 
Articulating responsibilities: Data Protection Impact 
Assessments Article 35; certifications including seals, 
marks and certification bodies Articles 42 and 43; new 
codes of conduct Articles 40 and 41 Responding to 
responsibilities: DPO Articles 37 and 39; DPbD Article 
25 
 
Requirement 6 states in Table 2.1 states the key dimensions of accountability for security 
are to ‘protect data storage and security’, based on ‘Accuracy of data Article 5(1d); 
integrity and confidentiality Article 5(1f); breach notification to authorities Article 33 
and to data subject Article 34; security of processing Article 32’. 
Articles 33 and 34 are around breach notification, notably dependent on the nature 
of breaches (scale, data compromised) and 72-hour time frames for doing this. Article 
5(1)(d) requires that data be accurate and up to date whilst inaccurate data be also 
handled swiftly (‘the accuracy principle’).  However, in this paper we focus on the 
technical or organisational aspects of the following two GDPR provisions: 
• Article 5 (1)(f) requires ‘appropriate security’ with processing to guard against 
‘unauthorised or unlawful processing and against accidental loss, destruction or 
damage’ with ‘appropriate technical or organisational measures’. 
• Article 32 requires technical and organisational safeguards for security to be built into 
processing, proportionate to risks and considering the state of the art, costs, and 
nature of processing. 
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When viewed alongside Articles 24 and 25, we see an increased focus on technical and 
organisational measures in the GDPR. For security, this could include controllers taking 
technical steps such as use of anonymisation; pseudonymisation; end-to-end 
encryption;13 regular testing of safeguard measures; mechanisms to ensure ongoing 
‘confidentiality, integrity, availability and resilience’ of systems; provisions giving the 
ability to restore access to data quickly.14 
As we will see in Section 2.3, there is a growing role for home occupants in 
managing DP compliance, and thus data security. The emergence of smart home 
security tools could be a mechanism that satisfies elements mentioned above. However, 
we want to explore the organisational dimensions of domestic compliance alongside the 
technical measures that might assist DDCs in demonstrating accountability, as the two 
cannot be separated easily. Furthermore, we focus on demonstrations to data subjects, 
as opposed to authorities in this paper, given the complex social issues this raises. We 
return to these issues of these systems, and organisational security management in smart 
homes in depth in Section 2.4, but firstly need to unpack why we are even talking about 
DDCs having a role to play here. Thus, in the next section we explain why DDCs exist 
as a class of controllers, and how we have reached this position legally. This involves 
two fundamental shifts in EU case law: a broadening of the notion of a data controller 
and a narrowing of the household exemption in DP law. 
2.3 Data Protection in the Home?  
To the extent that the principle of accountability imposes the major DP compliance 
duties on the data controller, it is of paramount practical importance to first identify the 
controller – or controllers – and then deicide the scope of their responsibilities. 
Ascertaining who is the de facto data controller, however, is not always straightforward, 
and the increasing prevalence of IoT devices used in spaces of various nature has 
brought in even more legal uncertainties, not least for the wider range of actors involved 
and heavier reliance on technical protocols. As will be elaborated below, the GDPR has 
set out several rules in order for the assignment of accountability duties to reflect the 
nature, risks and expectations regarding certain types of data processing activities [2]. 
Most importantly, the household exemption effectively creates a carve-out of the scope 
of the GDPR whereby domestic data controllers (DDCs) may be exempt from 
demonstrating compliance with the DP principles; joint controllership, on the other 
hand, establishes collective accountability for data controllers who jointly exercise 
control over the use of data. 
Both the household exemption and joint controllership are therefore important 
considerations for one to fulfil their duties under the principle of accountability. These 
two legal notions, however, have been subject to judicial and scholarly debates since the 
time of the Data Protection Directive. Recent case law and the entry into force of the 
GDPR have added further dimensions to the complex application to a domestic IoT 
setting. By reviewing the developments of these two concepts as well as their 
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interactions, we aim to unpack their implications for DDCs in relation to their 
observance of the accountability principle. 
2.3.1 The household exemption and its (in)applicability to domestic IoT 
Under the exemption provided for by Article 2(2), the GDPR ‘does not apply to the 
processing of personal data […] by a natural person in the course of a purely personal 
or household activity’. Any qualified domestic use of personal data, accordingly, would 
not be subject to any DP principles or restrictions, including the accountability principle. 
Two conditions of this provision immediately stand out: ‘by a natural person’ and 
‘purely personal or household activity’. 
The implication of the first condition is straightforward: This exemption applies 
only to individuals and not organisations, regardless of the possible household nature. 
Manufacturers of IoT devices or providers of IoT services are thus simply unable to 
claim this exemption even if the use of personal data proves indeed for purely personal 
purposes. For end-users of smart home technologies, there is room for a claim that DP 
law does not apply to them as long as the second condition is also met. This, in practice, 
would mean that such users, even if they would otherwise qualify as a data controller, 
do not need to comply, or demonstrate compliance, with any of the DP requirements. 
A secondary question would then arise as to whether other organisational joint 
controllers, if any, should be expected to demonstrate the end-user’s compliance as part 
of their accountability duties. We will discuss that issue in further detail in Section 2.4. 
Here, from the perspective of the users, the connection between the household 
exemption and the accountability principle is rather obvious: The application of former 
would lead to the complete exclusion of the latter. 
The much more complicated prong of the household exemption lies in the second 
condition, namely the purely personal nature of the processing in question. The recitals 
of GDPR (the non-binding statements in the preamble) as well as regulatory bodies 
have provided some general clarifications, but it is through the jurisprudence developed 
in the cases decided by the CJEU that specific complexities exhibit themselves in 
particular scenarios. In a highly relevant case, Ryneš [16], the Court was asked whether 
the operation of a CCTV camera on a residential building may be considered as a ‘purely 
personal or household activity’. The Court rejected the claim on the basis that the ‘video 
surveillance […] covers, […] partially, a public space and is accordingly directed 
outwards from the private setting of the person processing the data in that manner’ 
(para 33). This interpretation was followed in a later case Asociaţia de Proprietari bloc M5A-
ScaraA [17], in which the Court decided that the installation and operation of CCTV 
camera filming ‘the common parts of [an apartment] building in co-ownership and the 
approach to it’ (para 49) are also subject to the GDPR. 
It should be noted that in either case, the domestic purpose or intention was not 
questioned by the Court. In fact, the Court was fully aware that the data controller – i.e. 
the operator of the CCTV system – may have legitimate interests in ‘the protection of 
the property, health and life of his family and himself’ [16] (para 34) or ‘ensuring the 
safety and protection of individuals and property’ [17] (para 33). It is the operative method 
of the CCTV system that came to the central point of the Court’s analysis. The fact that 
the such a surveillance system may casually capture and store the image of individuals 
outside the data controller’s family in an electronic format will suffice for such activities 
to fall outside the scope of the household exemption. The implication of this judgment 
for smart home owners can be profound to the extent that many IoT devices are 
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capable, or indeed designed, to collect data from a space potential beyond the physical 
boundaries of one’s home. Visitors, neighbours, or even passers-by may be affected by, 
for example, the accidental collection of data from their smartphones when they 
approach the sensory remit of the user’s smart home system. 
Also, worth pointing out is that the CJEU has never ruled in favour of a claim of 
the household exemption. Rather, the Court has consistently taken a highly restrictive 
approach to interpreting this provision. By ruling out the applicability of the exemption 
to various cases, the scope of this exemption is increasingly shrinking, which may have 
an impact on any IoT end-users hoping to benefit from this exemption. The rationale 
of this interpretative approach is perhaps not difficult to understand: As discussed 
above, triggering the household exemption would mean the GDPR ceases to apply 
altogether to the case concerned, which would potentially create a regulatory vacuum to 
the detriment of the data subject. While the Court has laid down clear rules on what 
would not count as purely personal - data accessible by an unrestricted number of people, 
or concerns a public space beyond the private sphere [18] (para 42) – the only cases 
unquestionably exempt are those explicitly provided for in Recital 18 GDPR, namely 
‘correspondence and the holding of addresses, or social networking and online activity 
undertaken within the context of such activities’. 
As such, the circumstances under which a claim of the household exemption can 
be reasonably made by an end-user will need to be examined on a case-by-case basis. If 
the use of personal data in these context does not pass the threshold set out in the case-
law, the user would have to demonstrate compliance with the accountability principle. 
While the Court has never directly addressed Article 5(2) GDPR (or Article 6(2) DPD), 
it seems obvious that accountability suggests some form of duty of care to be assumed 
by the data controller even concerning merely household activities, which would entail 
an assessment of the technical options in the light of the interests and risks of the parties 
involved. As AG Jääskinen opined in Google Spain and Google [19], ‘Article 6(2) of the 
Directive obliges [data controllers] to weigh the interests of the data controller, or third 
parties in whose interest the processing is exercised, against those of the data subject.’ 
(para 107) In M5A-ScaraA [17], the Court also stated that ‘the proportionality of the 
data processing by a video surveillance device must be assessed by taking into account 
the specific methods of installing and operating that device’ (para 50) and ‘the controller 
must examine, for example, whether it is sufficient that the video surveillance operates 
only at night or outside normal working hours, and block or obscure the images taken 
in areas where surveillance is unnecessary.’ (para 51) How such considerations can be 
demonstrable by domestic users in practice, however, is a different and yet even more 
challenging issue. 
2.3.2 Domestic and non-domestic joint controllership in domestic IoT 
Another concept crucial to implementing the accountability requirements is joint 
controllership, as it defines how DP obligations are shared among a group of controllers 
who make co-decisions on how personal data are processed. Article 26(1) provides that 
‘Where two or more controllers jointly determine the purposes and means of 
processing, they shall be joint controllers.’ The same provision goes on to require joint 
controllers to ‘in a transparent manner determine their respective responsibilities for 
compliance with the obligations under this Regulation’. This definition seems to suggest 
that joint controllership arises from a unanimous decision by all controllers with regard 
to how they DP duties are split and discharged by each of them. However, the allocation 
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of duties cannot be determined on an arbitrary or unreasonable basis. Instead, such an 
arrangement must ‘duly reflect the respective roles and relationships of the joint 
controllers vis-à-vis the data subjects.’ This has also been emphasised in the opinions 
issued by the Article 29 Working Party. The Working Party has specifically highlighted 
the importance to establish ‘clear and equally effective allocation of obligations and 
responsibilities’ [20] that genuinely reflects the legal relationship of between the joint 
controllers. For example, if a contract substantially gives one an entity material powers 
to decide how data is processed, but formally only assigns a different entity with less 
influence as a sole controller, such an assignment would be invalid and the former entity 
would remain liable as a joint controller. 
Apart from the scenarios involving contractual arrangements, which are clearly 
covered by the definition of joint controllership, the CJEU has decided on a number of 
more complicated cases where such a contractual relationship does not clearly exist. For 
example, in Jehovan todistajat [18], the Court decided that the Jehovah’s Witnesses 
Community was a joint controller with its members with regard to the collection and 
use of personal data through door-to-door preaching. The judgment was concluded on 
the basis that the ‘preaching activity is […] organised, coordinated and encouraged by 
that community’ (para 70), regardless of the lack of formal instructions issued, or actual 
access to the data, by the Community (paras 67, 69). The mere organisational structure 
facilitating the processing of personal data was considered sufficient to give rise to joint 
controllership. 
Joint controllership may also result from activities aligned by technical protocols. 
The Court considered in Fashion ID [21] whether the operator of a website became a 
joint controller with Facebook by placing a ‘Like’ button on a webpage, which would 
trigger and enable Facebook to collect personal data from a visitor. This does not 
depend on any communications or existing legal relationship between the website and 
Facebook, and as such, the formation of joint controllership can be purely a matter of 
technical settings. Although Fashion ID does not concern a smart home context, the 
implications for domestic IoT users can be profound as the two scenarios bear some 
resemblances: One party controls the switch of a system, whose architecture is designed 
by the other party to allow the latter to collect personal data from third parties. In Chen 
et al. [2]’s words, the former possesses operational control and the latter schematic control. 
Data collection would not take place without the action of either party, but their 
cooperation does not rely on a formal mutual agreement, but simply by ways of technical 
configurations. 
The expanding coverage of joint controllership by the CJEU means that the ‘co-
decision’ by joint controllers does not have to take the form of contractual 
arrangements, but can be achieved simply with a much looser relation enabled by 
organisational or technical configurations. Recognising this point is especially crucial for 
compliance with the accountability principle because data controllers are under a clear 
obligation to ‘implement appropriate technical and organisational measures’ (Article 24 
GDPR). The nature of the joint controllership can be a critical first step in establishing 
what measures should be put in place to coordinate responsibilities and document 
compliance. In fact, the Court has noted that the joint controllers ‘may be involved at 
different stages of that processing of personal data and to different degrees, so that the 
level of responsibility of each of them must be assessed with regard to all the relevant 
circumstances of the particular case’ [22] (para 43). For example, in Fashion ID, the Court 
unequivocally pointed out that the duties to obtain consent from, and to provide 
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information to, visitors of a website with an embedded Facebook ‘Like’ button fall on 
the operator of the website, not Facebook, even though the data are transmitted only 
to the latter [21] (paras 98-106). A comparison can be made with the case of domestic 
use of IoT technologies, where the homeowner, if held jointly responsible with an IoT 
service provider who collects data potentially from non-members of the family, may be 
under a duty to ensure there is a legitimising basis and to inform the affected parties 
(e.g. guests) of the details. 
2.3.3 Accountability shared between domestic and non-domestic controllers 
Having discussed the implications of the narrowing scope of the household exemption 
and the widening application of joint controllership in case-law, now let us consider 
how these complexities would play out in observing the accountability principle in a 
variety of circumstances in an IoT-enabled smart home. Table 2.2 below shows different 
combinations of the nature of the processing and the category of the controllers. It 
should be noted that a domestic data controller (DDC) here refers simply to an 
individual processing personal data with an IoT device in their home, and does not 
necessarily imply such uses are for domestic purposes only, who may or may not be 
covered by the household exemption. Likewise, a non-domestic data controller (non-
DDC) is defined here as a controller other than a DDC, who does not have to process 
the data for a professional or commercial purpose. 
Table 2.2 Data controller(s) responsible to demonstrate accountability 
 DDC only DDC & non-DDC non-DDC only 
Purely domestic use Nobody non-DDC * N/A 
Non-domestic use DDC † DDC & non-DDC ‡ non-DDC § 
 
It is noteworthy that even if a particular use of personal data is within the course of a 
‘purely personal or household activity’, the household exemption would not apply to 
the non-DDC, meaning that the latter would remain responsible for the processing in 
question. This is because the household exemption operates essentially on a controller-
specific basis. Recital 18 GDPR makes it clear that ‘this Regulation applies to controllers 
or processors which provide the means for processing personal data for […] personal 
or household activities.’ As a result, the non-DDC may be held responsible as the sole 
controller in two scenarios, one where the domestic user does exercise control on the 
processing but is exempt from the duties due to the domestic nature of the processing 
(scenario *), and the other where the domestic user has no control at all (scenario §). 
While it is clear in the latter case that the non-DDC must demonstrate accountability 
concerning the full range of DP obligations, this is open to question in the former case 
where certain duties would have fallen on the DDC had the household exemption not 
applied. For example, consider the situation where a homeowner uses a smart 
thermostat in a guest room occupied by a visiting family guest, which sends room 
temperature data to the vendor’s server that are accessible only to the homeowner. 
Assuming such data are personal data and this is a purely household use of such data, 
would the vendor, as a non-DDC, be placed under any primary or secondary obligations 
to demonstrate that, say, there is a legitimate basis on the homeowner’s part to use such 
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data, or adequate information has been given to the guest? One interpretation of the 
household exemption can be that these duties would not apply at all once the exemption 
has been established, meaning that no demonstration of accountability would be 
required when it comes to such duties. However, it can be an equally valid contention 
that such duties do not apply, but just to the DDC, and the exemption does not preclude 
the non-DDC’s duties on these matters if they have not already been fulfilled by the 
domestic controller. Such uncertainties would call for further regulatory or judicial 
guidance. 
Another challenge is where it is incumbent on the DDC to demonstrate compliance 
with the DP principles, whether solely (scenario †) or jointly with the professional 
controller (scenario ‡), how their accountability can be demonstrated and assessed. The 
subtle differences mirrored in varying interpretations of the tensions between DDCs, 
non-DDCs and data subjects may remarkably affect our understanding of what is 
‘accountable’ and what is ‘demonstrable’ in a domestic IoT environment. Such nuances 
are not merely a legal fiction but rather a relational reflection of the complex socio-
technical attributes embedded in today’s smart homes. As will be seen in the next 
section, empirical evidence has suggested this is indeed a highly sophisticated landscape. 
Effective policymaking as well as enforcement of the accountability principle would 
therefore depend on a meticulous capture of the role of various solutions in both 
technical and organisational terms in managing accountability. It is in this regard that 
we now turn to the HCI scholarship for further answers. 
2.4 Accountable domestic data controllers 
In this part we align discussions from the two previous sections to pose questions 
around how domestic data controllers in smart homes can demonstrate accountability 
to data subjects in the home. As an emerging domain, we take this opportunity to 
explore related literature, and pose some questions to be addressed to understand what 
DP law coming into the home may mean in practical terms. We are interested in both 
the form and challenges that may arise in creating demonstrations of accountability. DDCs 
may have to provide appropriate security (Article 5(2) GDPR) and use technical and 
organisational measures to support secure data management (Article 32 GPDR). What 
this will look like in the domestic context requires unpacking, particularly around 
interpersonal relationships in homes. 
We focus here on technical measures, but consider how the organisational 
deployment setting (i.e. the home) will shape how technical measures might work or be 
adopted. Below, we turn to contemporary empirical and technical work from fields of 
human computer interaction and usable privacy/security, to help us unpack the 
following lines of inquiry: 
• What technical measures exist for supporting demonstrations of accountability, 
specifically focusing on smart home security management tools? 
• What occupant privacy and security management practices exist in smart homes, 
particularly around interpersonal relationships? 
• What socio-technical and usability problems might these tools raise with DDCs 
using them? 
• How might these discussions intersect with GDPR compliance requirements for 
DDCs, particularly for demonstrations of accountability? 
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A fundamental tension raised by the shifts outlined above is that giving DP 
responsibilities to DDCs is they lack both resources and skills of organisations that the legal 
framework was designed to apply to. Thus, there can be shared responsibility with 
vendors of smart home technologies or even those providing smart home security 
management tech (depending on the architecture). Ordinary organizational mechanisms 
are unlikely to work here e.g. will a partner be auditing the quality of their spouse’s 
password? Will they conduct a review of breach management strategies? What might 
domestic processing record keeping look like here and the description of measures 
taken?15 
Another is the compliance setting. It is not a company with organisational resources 
for record keeping capabilities or capacity to know when to do a data protection impact 
assessment or hire a data protection officer (many normal steps seen for accountability). 
Instead, it is a home; space where cohabitants live their daily lives. Thus, translating 
regulatory concepts to this domain could feel forced. Should regulatory norms structure 
domestic life? Domesticating technology itself can take time [23] and designing 
technologies so they can be embedded in daily lives requires an appreciation of what 
that life looks like [24]. The same will be true for designing technical and organisational 
measures for demonstrating accountability. We need to understand how security is managed 
currently in smart homes, and thus we firstly consider what tools there are and the 
context they will need to operate in i.e. what do occupants currently do? 
2.4.1 Smart home cybersecurity management tools 
Whilst traditionally (and still predominantly) the system architectures of IoT devices are 
centralised and cloud based, we are seeing increased use of distributed analytics and 
storage at the edge of networks. In terms of data handling responsibilities, managing 
these systems may increase the role for users and others (e.g. DDCs) at the edge of the 
network. This is often by design, in the case of some edge-based storage systems, such 
as personal information management systems (PIMS) like Databox, HAT, MyDex etc.16 
It is recognised in privacy policymaking and privacy engineering communities that PIMS 
can help users determine how their data is used, and increase control over who has 
access to it [26, 27]. Similarly, distributed data analytics can enable new privacy 
preserving forms of federated machine learning which can address ethical and 
governance concerns around data harvesting, severing personal data from users and 
associated privacy harms stemming from big data analytics. This shift to ‘small data’ led 
systems [28, 29] can empower users, address data protection compliance concerns, 
particularly around opacity of data flows and power asymmetries around access by third 
parties [1]. Nevertheless, these systems still require (sometimes high levels of) oversight 
and awareness around how to do this. Given varying skillsets and motivations to manage 
privacy and security, this could be problematic. Interface design often does not help 
either (as we return to in topic 3). 
These systems open up scope for edge-based systems for security management to 
enabling smarter network monitoring and security management tools. There are a range 
of commercial and research led offerings, including Cujo [30], IoT Keeper [31] and Sense 
                                                        
15 Article 30 GDPR – documenting details about processing e.g. purposes of processing, categories of 
data and subjects etc but importantly, under Article 30(1)(g): ‘where possible, a general description of 
the technical and organisational security measures referred to in Article 32(1).’ 
16 See Urquhart et al. [25] for more details. 
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[32]. We describe a few examples below, including both prototypes and commercial 
products. 
• IoT Inspector examines device firmware for security vulnerabilities after it is  
uploaded to the platform, analysed and risks reported back [33, 34]. It is geared 
towards a range of industry stakeholders, particularly vendors, and thus could be 
useful for joint controllers, where responsibility lies with them, in addition to 
DDCs.17 
• Fingbox is a consumer orientated physical box that can be bought for the home. It 
monitors network activity (including open ports), conducts vulnerability analysis, 
blocks intruders or unknown devices, and observes who is on the network.18  
• Wireshark is an open source, freely available network protocol analyser that 
provides granular analysis on network activity by sniffing packets. It can be used 
for intrusion detection too [35]. For an everyday user, there may be skillset 
requirements in interpreting this data.  
• Homesnitch is a prototype that seeks to increase transparency and control over 
domestic networks by classifying device behaviour. As opposed to just reporting 
packet flow it ‘learns’ about behaviour in order to report on what this might mean 
e.g. ‘downloading firmware, receiving a configuration change, and sending video 
to a remote user’ [36]. This could be more contextually useful for users.  
• IoT Sentinel is another prototype architecture where the system has a more active 
role in managing network security. It identifies types of devices on a network, 
spots any security vulnerabilities and then enforces network rules against these 
devices automatically. This latter step can range from isolating devices and 
blocking external access, filtering traffic to prevent data being exfiltrated or 
notifying users of issues [37].  
• The DADA system seeks to monitor network traffic for vulnerable devices and 
unexpected behaviours (e.g. using MUD profiles). It then informs users of 
different options to deal with vulnerable devices e.g. to block the device from the 
network etc [38]. 
• Aretha includes an integrated training aspect for end users, firewall management 
and a network disaggregator [39]. Part of the tool gave users the ability to set 
directives for the firewall in a user friendly way e.g. with a GUI and in plain 
language. Despite this, they found there was need to simplify this to enable user 
adoption, coupled with difficulties in users analysing risk of safety or danger in 
blocked domains. The researchers posit a greater role for experts pre-formulating 
black lists that users can then tweak, or using presence of certain metrics to block 
sources e.g. ‘company reputation, jurisdiction, purpose of data collection, retention 
and disclosure properties’.19 This tool also offers training, visualisations and a 
physical presence, all helping strengthen collective user engagement with security 
                                                        
17 Also targeted to corporate users, infrastructure providers, researchers and resellers. 
18 https://www.fing.com/products/fingbox 
19 They highlight that it does a variety of things: ‘the probe brought about not just a heightened awareness 
of privacy concerns—by being a salient and visible physical totem in their living room—but a 
transformative one, in which privacy management transitioned from being a solo concern anchored with 
the individual responsible for technology within the home, to one discussed between multiple home 
stakeholders. The visibility of the probe within the home inspired conversations among household 
members, and the visualisations provided a common ground”’ (p9). 
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and privacy management. 
Whilst these tools show promise as technical measures for DDCs demonstrating 
accountability to other occupants, we also believe there are complex socio-technical 
considerations around their possible integration into the home. Thus, we will review 
some literature around current user security management practices in smart homes. 
2.4.2 Security (and privacy) management in smart homes 
Security does matter to smart home users. A study by Emami-Naeini et al. [40] found 
that whilst not as highly valued as price and features, both privacy and security are 
important factors when buying new IoT devices. Nevertheless, consumers can find it 
difficult to obtain information about the security and privacy credentials of a product 
but do state they may be willing to pay a premium (between 10-30%) for a device with 
this information.20 
In the wild, user concerns around security and privacy threats in smart homes vary. 
Zeng et al. [41] find participant concerns focused on physical security e.g. control over 
smart locks enabling home access. They observed that different levels of technical 
knowledge shaped their awareness of types of IoT vulnerabilities e.g. skilled users were 
concerned about HTTPS, less skilled about weak passwords or unsecured Wi-Fi (p 71). 
They also observed this knowledge shaped how users manage risks from changing 
behaviour e.g. avoiding speaking in front of Alexa to more skilled participants setting 
up a separate Wi-Fi networks or blocking traffic. 
Looking to smart speakers, as an example smart home system, Huang et al. [42] 
unpack privacy concerns around smart speakers with respect to internal 
(siblings/flatmates), key for DDCS to consider. These include: 
• Concerns about overheard calls,  
• unauthorised access to contact details, calendars or reminders on speakers, due to 
inadequate voice authentication (e.g. it is open to all as opposed to being tied to a 
specific users’ voice). 
• speakers being exploited for unintended uses by children or visitors like 
unauthorised purchases 
In terms of managing these concerns, more skilled users might not link any private 
information with the speaker and they suggest there could be routes for customising 
speakers to share information users might be comfortable their peers accessing. 
As Crabtree et al. [43] have noted, within the home, the nature of control and who 
accesses information is not always framed in ‘privacy’ terms. Often it is about managing 
relationships and is part of the work of living with networked systems. As they state, 
‘“privacy” dissolves into a heterogeneous array of mundane practices and local concerns 
that are not primarily to do with the disclosure of personal data, but with 
managing who gets to access what devices, applications, and content’. However, with 
the emergence of data protection norms within smart homes, it forces reflection on 
how informational privacy might be reframed, and how those norms structure domestic 
                                                        
20 They argue labelling schemes might offer viable solutions in simplifying information provision. 
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relationships and practices. We now turn to studies exploring security management in 
homes in more depth, particularly interpersonal aspects. 
2.4.3 Interpersonal power dynamics in smart homes 
Geeng and Roesner [44] provide valuable insights into social power dynamics in smart 
homes, particularly around the ‘smart home driver’ i.e. the individual who wants to have 
the device in the home. Drivers have a prominent role when something goes wrong and 
in mediating access / control over the devices for other occupants. This can differ 
across the life cycle of devices e.g. when first installing to long term management.21 
They note that drivers are ordinarily men and had more interest in learning about using 
the devices, thus giving more power and agency in the home, whereas other relied on 
them to manage change (p 8). Drivers may be more likely to be the DDCs, as the one 
managing the device and its processing in the home. 
Their role can be problematic for other occupants and Zeng et al. [41] provide data 
from those who are not primary but ‘incidental’ users in the home. They observed 
incidental users might not have apps installed or even have access to functionality of 
devices. This ranges from less interest to restrictions from primary users to prevent 
them from changing settings e.g. restricting change of thermostats. This control can 
take different forms, from landlords remotely observing transcripts from smart speakers 
or security camera footage to monitoring use of the home e.g. parties, or even surveilling 
when other household members leave/arrive at the home (e.g. husband monitoring 
smart lock). The latter example aligns with earlier studies from Ur et al. [45] around 
impacts on family dynamics from parents observing when children arrive home through 
smart lock logs. Zeng et al. [41] conclude, ‘while the people who set up smart homes, 
particularly early adopters, often treat the technology as a personal hobby, smart homes 
are fundamentally not personal technologies. As a result, any security and privacy (or 
other) decisions made by the primary user directly affects other residents and visitor’ 
(p75).  
More concerningly, this power could link into Freed et al. [46]’s work examining 
how technology is used for intimate partner violence. They observe how authorised 
users use functionality that they have access to in order to track, manipulate and threaten 
their partners. In response, they recommend use of reviews during the design process 
or managing default settings when systems are adopted (e.g. removing display of recent 
location information). Clearly in smart homes this could be a risk and the work of Parkin 
et al. [47] responds by developing different usability heuristics to assess risks IoT devices 
create for intimate partner violence. Recent work by Levy and Schneier [48] further 
theorises how smart home technologies can facilitate invasion of privacy in intimate 
relationships by augmenting the coercive power possessed by the member with explicit 
or implicit authority. 
Mundane smart home device account management can also raise power issues in 
families. Goulden [49] explores the way firms, such as Google and Amazon construct 
hierarchies in the household to coordinate everyday activities. This can involve linking 
accounts and defining roles in the home e.g. by attributes like age. This can enable 
control over others accounts and what they can do with and observe uses of devices 
                                                        
21 e.g. ‘Device Selection; Device Installation; Regular Device Use; Things Go Wrong; Long-Term Device 
Use’. 
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e.g. remove permissions or delete from family group. Goulden is concerned about the 
impacts on domestic family life of this type of intervention.  
In smart homes, data is co-constructed and relational, it often does not only identify 
one individual [50]. This can lead to difficulties for us in thinking about data 
controllership and subjects. In a home, both DDCs and data subjects may be identifiable 
e.g. in traces from sensors in the home. Reconciling this issue needs further attention 
around the duality of how a controller can be both a steward for personal data of others 
in the home, alongside their own. This is further complicated when we consider the 
joint nature of controllership with IoT vendors, who may not have the same interests 
in this data. Family members would likely want to protect the data of other family 
members (violence and abuse notwithstanding), but, as we know, IoT vendors may seek 
to monetise and use that data to understand everyday life and make inferences. The 
power dynamic between controllers and subjects in this domain will remain messy.  
Desjardins et al. [51] observe different relationships with data in smart homes, and 
how data is visualised within the home by occupants, developing how data is part of 
experiencing the home and daily life.  They see ‘IoT data not as an undefined, 
ephemeral, position-less, and singular mass (although it might be conceptualized this 
way): these data are, in fact, of a home, in a home, and part of unique domestic 
assemblages which are important to recognize and honour when designing for them.’ 
This point further highlights how established labels and categories in DP law around 
personal data, identifiability and prescriptive responsibilities over data might not 
translate to the home context, where the messiness of data is part of life. Yet, with DP 
law entering the home DDCs will face responsibilities for other occupants. They will 
need to consider how what they do fits with legal terms of art, like personal data, and 
how they can demonstrate they are protecting data rights of others. 
2.4.4 Control struggles in smart homes 
Despite thinking about these near future issues, we need to unpack how control of data 
and devices is managed currently in smart homes, given accountability requires 
demonstrations from DDCs to subjects (i.e. between family members). Thus, it is 
valuable to consider what types of control issues smart homes pose for daily life.  
Geeng and Roesner [44] consider some of the interpersonal tensions different 
stakeholders’ face in controlling domestic smart technologies. Examples include: partners 
disagreeing about third party access via door lock code (e.g. cleaners); roommates 
controlling temperature via apps, where others do not use the app; sibling locking each 
other’s media accounts for punishment; parents and children competing for control of 
an Amazon Echo e.g. with music it plays (p 6). Physical security and safety concerns 
around co-occupants being able to still use resources despite lack of expertise or account 
control like lighting, heating and exit/entry. This is particularly important when devices 
stop working, e.g. in DIY smart homes.  
Given the home is a shared space, co-management of devices and how groups 
manage security of shared resources is an important consideration we return to below. 
Such relational complexities are perhaps exacerbated by the heterogeneity of 
governance structure of smart systems, or in Singh et al. [52]’s words, the ‘systems-of-
systems’ nature of IoT. Technologies can play a role, they argue, in enabling 
accountability by supporting control and audit of IoT systems. 
Mazurek et al. [53] consider how access control across devices is managed in homes, 
exploring the complexity of creating approaches that work in practice vs how users want 
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them to work. Whilst focused on protecting sensitive data on laptops or phones, it is 
interesting the lessons about shared device usage for IoT too. Designers need to enable 
users to create granular access controls, to enable subtle creation of guest accounts (to 
avoid awkwardness when sharing devices). Interestingly, they noted that in deciding 
about access, it went beyond types of files (work; music; photos etc) and who the other user 
was e.g. partner, parents, friends etc). Instead, factors such as presence and location of 
both controller and those accessing files was important, as was the device type (e.g. 
phones more personal) and even time of day (e.g. in the evening where sleep should be 
occurring). These show what might shape access policies to information and how for 
IoT.  
This is valuable to further reflect on concerns of Goulden [49] that smart homes 
having formalised models of control, access and roles.  Here, we can see, the home is 
messy, and notions of accountability play out differently there, unlike in institutional 
security policies with strict hierarchies, safelists and permissions work more effectively. 
In homes, it needs to be more dynamic and contextual. In terms of how vendors might 
support accountability, as joint controllers, this is an area for further work on designing 
more adaptive forms of permissions and account management. One route forward 
could be from ID management protocols. Rosner and Kenneally [54] have argued in 
relation to IoT privacy that identity management is important to consider because it 
involves ‘discussion of privacy as control, access management, and selective sharing’. 
They suggest building systems that prevent linking of identities and unobservability of 
users by default, in addition to value of protocols such as UMA, which enable user led 
control of access and selective permissions.22 
For DDCs, this could be a valuable tool but would require vendors to enable such 
functionality. In terms of other routes forward, we now consider the importance of 
engaging others in the home in security management. 
2.4.5 Towards collective security management in homes? 
Geeng and Roesner [44] argue that designers need to be more aware of different 
relationship types in homes and also consider how to make the account creation process 
more sensitive to multiple occupancy with shared devices. They suggest IoT designers 
need to incorporate ‘mechanical switches and controls’ for basic device functionality 
like switching on or off.  They also suggest need for measures to manage temporary 
device access for short term occupants and also for deletion/migration of data when 
people move out.   Similarly, Zeng et al. [41] recognise systems should ‘support multiple 
distinct user accounts, usability and discoverability of features are critical for secondary, 
less technical users’  e.g. using physical controls and indicators in the home for when 
being recorded.  
Tabassum et al. [55] have also looked beyond the walls of the home, to consider 
how use of smart devices is shared with others outside and the nature of this shared 
management. Factors such as security are critical for enabling others to access devices 
to deal, with motivations like helping manage deliveries or emergencies when occupants 
are away. Enabling remote access to the home with smart locks or safety of pets and 
older people is another example.  However, they noted that this has to be underpinned 
by trust in the community they are sharing access with and because of this, often it was 
full access given to external parties, as opposed to more nuanced forms. Here, we can 
                                                        
22 https://kantarainitiative.org/confluence/display/uma/Home  
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see that DDCs might not just be parties within the home but managing data flows as an 
external party. 
Similarly, Watson et al. [56] reflect on collective management of cybersecurity for a 
range of resources (devices, social media, streaming accounts etc). Whilst not specifically 
for smart homes, a key concern raised is those inside the group posing threats to group 
as a whole, in part due individual to poor security practices compromising the group as 
a whole. Whilst in practice, the participants hold each other accountable for shared 
resources, ‘group security is only as strong as the individual with the weakest security 
behaviours, which can be inequitable and lead to resentment’. Thus, each member has 
responsibility, even if unsupervised by others to do their best, and they can risk losing 
access to these resources. In contrast to papers above flagging concerns around 
hierarchies, they suggest need for tools to address this weakest link element, and to 
allow ‘group members with higher S&P awareness, motivation and knowledge to act as 
stewards for more vulnerable members.    
Whilst this may be pragmatic, as we see above, vesting too much control in one 
party can lead to other risks, and impacts for the domestic social order. With DDCs 
navigating responsibilities, clearly there will be questions around to what extent 
collective management makes sense (e.g. in flat shares) vs one party managing security 
on behalf of everyone (e.g. with a family or elderly user). However, this should not just 
be because of the assumptions that a smart device driver will do this, or because of the 
affordances of a system around accounts. 
Irrespective of if there is individual or collective control over devices in the home, 
one issue remains around the usability of systems.  Adoption of technical solutions for 
accountability, such as the security systems mentioned above, need to be usable.  In the 
enterprise context, there can be a perception that users are to blame for security not 
being managed effectively, but adopting user centric design principles or 
communicating how to use a system properly could address these [57].    Dourish et al. 
[58] examined system security manifests in everyday life for users. They focus on the 
disconnect between user goals and security goals can often leave users unsure how best 
to secure their systems.   They state security for ubiquitous computing environments 
needs to be ‘manageable and understandable to end users.   
There are attempts to support user preferences around privacy practices for IoT 
with privacy assistants. Colnago et al. [59] qualitative study of user needs from privacy 
assistants showed different user preferences around degrees of automation, control and 
frequency of notifications. They advocate systems be built with modularity and 
configurability of autonomy for users to tweak systems individually.  Part of this is 
assistants providing external recommendations, which is preferred to recommendations 
based on past behaviour, although the systems might need to provide choice over what 
recommended sources are used (again enabling tweaking by the user).  
Nevertheless, this may change over time. Jakobi et al. [60] found the level of 
information users seek whilst managing smart homes differs over time. At the beginning 
there is a desire for more granular information and feedback on current and past 
behaviour. As years passed, this reduced to wanting information when systems ‘not 
working, needed their attention, or required active maintenance’.   How Article 5(2) 
requirements may require more long term oversight might not intersect with domestic 
practice. Thus, there is scope for the law to disrupt how users might ordinarily live with 
smart technologies. In attempting to subject the home to regulatory norms, like 
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accountability, this may impact how systems are integrated into daily life by requiring 
mechanisms that prolong system oversight and may even disrupt the social order 
2.4.6 Differentiated responsibilities 
We have seen the narrowing of the household exemption and joint controllership 
arrangements emerging, leading DP law to enter the home.  
DDCs managing data collection in the home are still reliant on data processing 
architectures defined by others. This is unlike the normal situation for a controller where 
they design and define the nature of processing. Clearly, vendors of IoT devices, or 
those providing security management tools have a role to play in shaping how DDCs 
manage data domestically. They may even be joint controllers, depending on if they 
process personal data too, e.g. via analytics, cloud storage etc.  
In any case, if they are joint controllers, they too are implicated in the need to help 
demonstrate accountability with GDPR. As this section has shown, the provision of 
security management tools themselves could help to provide technical measures 
required. We conclude by thinking about how accountability obligations for security 
might be shared by vendors and DDCs. 
There is a clear role for vendors in helping DDCs manage data processing in the 
home. Two key areas that have emerged are around improving quality of account 
management tools. Current approaches do not reflect the context of use and 
complexities of permissions, accounts and access. Another is around ensuring that there 
is usability of security tools. Whilst there are promising approaches emerging, increased 
engagement with DDCs and users is necessary to see the competencies, skillsets and 
challenges they face in using these systems. Some are technical, where users may lack 
those skills; others may want more control. Vendors should do more in integrating such 
systems into their offerings, including using user centric design principles to shape what 
this looks like. Such a supportive role results not just from the fact that vendors tend to 
be better resourced and skilled in managing security threats, but also more importantly, 
they are in a unique position to have native, usable tools built into their products to 
achieve and demonstrate compliance. There is also an economic case to be made here, 
considering how vendors may be held jointly liable for data breaches caused by security 
incidents [61]. Broadly speaking, one can even argue what accountability means for 
vendors is two-fold: To be able to demonstrate their own compliance, and to be able to 
demonstrate usable solutions provided to DDCs to facilitate their compliance. 
With or without the support from vendors, there is also a clear role for DDCs in 
demonstrating accountability. On one hand, this may be as simple as adopting the use 
of technical measures, systems like Aretha, DADA, IoTSentinel, and relying on this as 
a demonstration of what they are doing to secure the home. However, as discussed, the 
home is a complex organisational space for these technologies to be used. They also 
have to integrate with how security of IoT devices is currently managed in the home. 
This includes thinking about interpersonal relationships, control, power asymmetries 
and guarding against abuses of such power. Ordinarily, such practices would not be 
mediated by legal requirements and further work will be necessary to see how DP law 
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might restructure the social order of the home, by introducing new formally defined 
accountability norms. 
2.5 Overall conclusions 
In conclusion, within this paper, we began by exploring the nature of the accountability 
principle and thinking about security compliance obligations in GDPR. We then charted 
two fundamental shifts in recent EU DP case law: the narrowing of the household 
exemption in DP law and the broadening of notions of joint data controllership. The 
consequence of this is a new class of domestic data controller with responsibilities to 
other home occupants when processing their personal data. To contextualise this shift, 
we considered the implications for accountability in smart homes, and how home 
occupants who find themselves as DDCs might demonstrate compliance with security 
requirements of GDPR. We focused on the organisational setting of the home, as a site 
of smart technology use, and the types of technical tools available to DDCs that could 
provide a demonstration of accountability. However, we also raised complex questions 
that need to be addressed in order for DDCs to do this effectively. These ranged from 
unpacking the nature of interpersonal relations in the home around power, control and 
access; how technical tools might intersect with current security concerns and practices; 
and the differentiated nature of responsibility between joint controllers, the vendors of 
smart home technologies and the DDCs. 
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